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war, but under Dönitz’s leadership it
was changed and revitalized, on the
basis of his childhood knowledge of the
hunting habits of wolves (pp. 35–38).
First gaming tactics for U-boats attempting to pierce the convoy formations,
then tactics for defending against those
U-boats, Roberts and his team created a
countertactic they code-named “Raspberry” (p. 161). Later, another tactic,
known as “Pineapple,” was employed
when U-boats were detected far from
the convoy by reconnaissance flights,
intelligence reports, communications intercepts, or other means.
Parkin opens his narrative with a
chance meeting between Dönitz and
Roberts on 23 May 1945, as Dönitz
was coming down a ship’s gangway on
his way to be interrogated and Roberts
was boarding the ship. From this
coincidental moment, during which
each acknowledged the other, the
author’s story begins. A colorful and
interesting retelling of one aspect of
the naval war in the Atlantic ensues.
The book’s excellent character sketches
weave a tapestry of human interest and
military history. Drawing on numerous archives, including unpublished
diaries of Roberts and other Roberts
family holdings, the author is able to
provide details and offer insights that
have eluded others. He also tells a story
of unit leadership, camaraderie, and
effectiveness. In so doing, Parkin creates
a book that reminds us of the dedication
displayed by the many individuals who
worked toward a common cause of
victory. Even with continued postwar
secrecy regarding much of the work
that was done, there remained lasting
friendships. One interesting link
Parkin presents is between the work
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of the Wrens at Derby House and that
of other Wrens at Bletchley Park.
The book offers a lot of background,
including several pages on the history
of the use of war games, especially naval
war games (pp. 94–98). The story is
not limited to the activities at Derby
House. Coverage of the efforts and
operations of U-boat commanders helps
to portray the formidable challenge
the Allies faced at sea, as well as those
ashore who sought to develop tactics
to overcome the German wolf packs.
Although it is probably publisher’s
hyperbole to subtitle the book’s subject
as the effort that “won the war,” Parkin’s
work does highlight the significance
of war gaming before and during
World War II. Sixteen pages of very
interesting photographs enhance the
book, as does a select bibliography and
helpful endnotes. Although the story
being told is not a new one, it is not
well-known. One hopes that this volume
will be read widely and do much to
raise awareness of the value of naval
war gaming and the substantial efforts
of the Wrens and WATU during World
War II. It is a book well worth reading.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation,
and the Longest Night of the Second World War,
by Malcolm Gladwell. New York: Little, Brown,
2021. 256 pages. $27.

Malcolm Gladwell is well known for
his books on popular culture and
finding the unexpected in social science
research. Writings such as The Tipping
Point (2000), Blink (2005), and Outliers
(2008) have received wide acclaim.
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Reading Gladwell’s latest book brings
to mind two quotes by notable
Americans. Author Tom Wolfe stated
that “[a]n intellectual is a person who is
knowledgeable in one field but speaks
out only in others.” The second comes
from Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale
in his October 1977 change of command
speech at the Naval War College: “My
experience, and it has been rather
recent, puts me back in old Clausewitz’
camp. He said, ‘War is a special
profession. However general its relation
may be . . . war would still continue
to be different and separate from any
other activity which occupies the life of
man.’ ” Gladwell’s book, read with those
words in mind, is interesting indeed.
On a subject that is complex both
strategically and morally, Gladwell has
written a short, breezy, and superficial
book—attempting something that
few authors would in two-hundredplus pages of large print. It is about
developments and conflicts during
the 1930s and 1940s within U.S. Army
aviation (and what would become the
U.S. Air Force) over pinpoint, highaltitude bombing. More specifically,
it is about the conflict between the
two bombing archetypes of that era:
• General Haywood S. Hansell Jr.:
“Bomber Mafia” member and romantic, “moralistic” proponent of daylight,
pinpoint, high-altitude, strategic
bombing
• General Curtis E. LeMay: practical,
freethinking, “brutal” proponent of
“get ’er done” strategic bombing, who
led from the front
This conflict started in the heady early
days of aviation, with the unlimited
possibilities resulting from a set of new
technologies for a future-focused Army
Air Corps set against that entity’s more
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earthbound competitors, the Army
itself and the Navy. Gladwell covers the
development of the bombsight, which
was essential for precision bombing. He
accepts (and adds to) the hype at that
time that helped the less-capable Norden
bombsight be chosen over the better,
newer Sperry bombsight. In doing so,
Gladwell touches on only some of the
deficiencies with the Norden bombsight
that prevented truly pinpoint bombing
from high altitudes. This is not the only
area he misunderstands; he explains,
for example, that aircraft “take off with
the help of the usual strong tailwind
blowing down the runway” (p. 129).
Unfortunately, Gladwell bypasses the issues involved in answering whether strategic bombing truly was effective. This
issue would plague the U.S. military going
into the Korean conflict with a disabled
Navy, as well as in Vietnam, where the
limits of airpower were learned (again), as
Mark Clodfelter later analyzed well in his
book The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (2006).
Gladwell likes Hansell for his uncompromising attitude of sticking with
the “more moral” precision bombing,
even though the more practical,
innovative, and effective LeMay completely upstaged Hansell twice, once
in Germany and again in Japan.
Gladwell blatantly instructs us how to
feel: “We can admire Curtis LeMay,
respect him, and try to understand
his choices. But Hansell is the one
we give our hearts to. Why? Because
I think he provides us with a model
of what it means to be moral in our
modern world. . . . [T]he only way
those new technologies serve some
higher purpose is if a dedicated band
of believers insists that they be used
to that purpose. That is what the
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Bomber Mafia tried to do” (p. 198).
What Gladwell does not understand
is that warriors more readily follow a
successful leader, particularly one who
shares risks with those they command.
Additionally, Gladwell—like others so
clever—does not understand how wars,
limited or total, truly are won. While he
interviews and quotes a few selected authors from military colleges, he does not
appear to have included in his research
any classic thought on the subject—concepts that have endured across time.
Such would include Clausewitz’s dictum
that “[w]ar is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” or even a
more recent American, but still classic,
one from William Tecumseh Sherman,
that “[w]ar is cruelty, and you can’t
refine it.” And finally, here is another
instructive Sherman observation: “Every
attempt to make war easy and safe will
result in humiliation and disaster.”
At the end of the book, Gladwell recounts
his meeting with current senior activeduty Air Force generals, who discuss just
how accurate their precision weapons
have become today. One gets the feeling
that “shock and awe” was on Gladwell’s
mind as he was regaled with Tom
Clancy–like precision examples. He concludes, “The genius of the Bomber Mafia
was . . . We don’t have to slaughter the
innocent, burn them beyond recognition,
in pursuit of our military goals. We can
do better. And they were right” (p. 206).
Were they? Gladwell ignores
Clausewitz’s dictum that “[w]ar is
thus an act of force to compel . . .”
The sought-after precision? Instead
of a “more moral” war, we just have
more moral problems. We should
remember that “you can’t refine it.”
PAT MCKIM
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The Sailor’s Bookshelf: Fifty Books to Know the
Sea, by James G. Stavridis [Adm., USN (Ret.)].
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 232
pages. $24.95.

Admiral James G. “Zorba” Stavridis’s
story is well known; he needs little
introduction. His career started with the
U.S. Naval Academy class of 1976; he
advanced through service and command
at sea and headquarters tours at the
Pentagon. He then was Commander,
U.S. Southern Command from 2006 to
2009 and finally Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO, through 2013.
His postservice roles have included
vice-chairman for global affairs of the
Carlyle Group, chair of the board of
trustees for the Rockefeller Foundation,
and dean of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Stavridis has written ten previous books
and numerous articles and papers,
including The Leader’s Bookshelf (2017).
This is another book about books,
but of a more personal nature, in that
it covers those works that shaped his
views of the sea—the nautical milieu
that has been at the core of his career.
For anyone who ever has been afloat,
the experience often is awe inspiring.
Exposure to a plethora of professional reading lists seems to be a part
of modern military careers. However,
these lists usually do not explain how to
differentiate a classic from a best seller.
There appear to be so many books and
too little time to read them; in fact,
professional education often teaches
the virtue of speed-reading, just to stay
ahead of the volume of material to be
covered. At present, it seems that while
people know how to read, many choose
not to, in favor of gaining “electronic
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